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APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) gives this court jurisdiction pursuant to the Order 
of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah dated June 22, 2004, transferring this case 
from the Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), 
Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Contract Interpretation. At issue before this Court is the interpretation 
of two paragraphs of a "LISTING AGREEMENT AND AGENCY DISCLOSURE," 
(hereinafter the "Listing Agreement") entered into between Tom Heal Commercial Real 
Estate, Inc. (hereinafter "Heal" or "Broker") and Glen Overton /and his Interests.1 The 
1
 The two disputed paragraphs of the Listing Agreement are as follows: 
2. BROKERAGE FEE. If, during the Listing Period, the Company, the 
Seller's Agent, The Seller, another real estate agent, or anyone else locates a 
party who is ready, willing and able to buy, lease, or exchange (collectively 
referred to as "acquire") the Property, or any part thereof, at the listing price 
and terms stated on the attached property data information form, or any 
other price and terms to which the Seller may agree in writing, the Seller 
agrees to pay to the Company a brokerage fee in the amount of six percent 
(6%) of such acquisition price. In the case of a lease of the Property, the 
commission shall be the commission percentage times the aggregate of all 
lease payments during the full term of the lease. Seller shall be obligated to 
pay a commission on [sic] of six percent (6%) on any and all lease renewals 
at the time of such renewals. The brokerage fee, unless otherwise agreed in 
writing by the Seller and the Company, shall be due and payable on (a) the 
date of closing of the acquisition of the Property; or (b) 50% due and 
payable when the lease is signed, and 50% due and payable upon the first 
day of the lease commencement; or (c) the first day of the lease renewal 
commencement; or (d) the date the option is signed. 
3. Protection Period. If within twenty-four months after the termination 
or expiration of this Listing Agreement, the Property is acquired by a party 
to whom the Property was offered or shown by the Company, the Seller's 
Agent, the Seller, another real estate agent, or by any other person during 
5 
district court found that Zion's Holding Company, L.C. (hereinafter "Zions") ratified the 
contract by paying the initial commission due to Heal for finding a buyer/lessee for the 
property. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusions of Law f 1. As seen 
in footnote one, the two disputed paragraphs provide guidelines for payment of 
brokerage fees and establish a protection period of twenty-four months (hereinafter 
"Protection Period"). Heal asserts Zions must pay Heal a brokerage fee on any and all 
lease renewals. Zions asserts the Protection Period limited its responsibility to pay 
brokerage fees. However, as explained in the amicus brief filed by the Utah Association 
of Realtors and the National Association of Realtors (hereinafter "Amicus Brief), the 
protection period exists to prevent fraud by the seller and/or buyer; the protection period 
does not exist to limit the payment of commissions.2 Nonetheless, the district court 
determined that the Protection Period paragraph, when read in harmony with the 
brokerage fee paragraph, limited the time for which lease renewal brokerage fees were 
due to Heal. Thus, the first issue before this Court is whether the district court erred 
when it found that a commission is payable by Zions to Heal for a lease renewal only 
if the renewal arises within the Protection Period, where the Listing Agreement 
plainly states, "Seller shall be obligated to pay a commission . . . of six percent (6%) 
the Listing Period, the Seller agrees to pay to the Company the brokerage 
fee stated in Section 2 unless the Seller is obligated to pay a brokerage fee 
on such acquisition to another brokerage pursuant to another valid listing 
contract entered into after the expiration or termination date of this Listing 
Agreement. 
2
 The purpose of the protection period, as discussed in the Amicus Brief filed by 
the Utah Association of Realtors and the National Association of Realtors is to Prohibit 
the seller from avoiding the payment of the broker's commission by 1) meeting the ready 
and willing buyer provided by the broker, 2) waiting for the expiration of the listing 
period, and 3) selling or leasing the property to the buyer after the expiration of the listing 
period in order to avoid the obligation to pay the commission to the broker. See Amicus 
Brief, Protection Period paragraph p. 7. 
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on any and all lease renewals at the time of such renewals." 
a. Standard of review: Interpretation of a contract is a question of law that this 
court reviews for correctness, and on such questions the appellate court 
accords the district court's interpretation "no presumption of correctness." 
Sacklerv. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah \995)(quoting Zions First 
Natl Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988)). 
b. Citation to the record: Complaint ^ [16. 
2. Attorneys' fees. If the district court is reversed is Zions entitled to 
attorneys' fees? Additionally, if the district court is reversed, is Heal entitled to its 
attorneys' fees? 
a. Standard of review: The district court's granting of attorney fees to a party 
is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Keith Jorgens en's, Inc. v. 
Ogden City Mall Co., 26 P.3d 872, 876 (Utah App.2001)(citing Dejavue, 
Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 993 P.2d 222(Utah App. 1999)). 
b. Citation to the Record: Complaint f 21. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
1. Contract Interpretation 
-Sacklerv. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah 1995). 
-Zions First Nat'I Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 
1988). 
2. Attorneys' fees 
-Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 ( stating "[a] court may award costs and attorney's 
fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note 
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written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the 
provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least 
one party to recover attorney's fees.") 
-Rule 34(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (authorizing the appellate 
court to award fees and costs to the prevailing party) 
-Management Semices Corp., v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d406, 409 (Utah 
1980)(stating "a provision for payment of attorney's fees in a contract includes 
attorney's fees incurred by the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial. . ."). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case: The underlying case involves a contract dispute concerning 
realtor/broker commissions. 
Course of Proceedings: Heal filed a complaint against Zions and Glen Overton 
alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit and breach of implied 
contract of good faith and fair dealing. Defendant Glen Overton was residing in Australia 
at the commencement of the suit. Heal filed a Motion to Serve Complaint and Summons 
on Defendant Overton Pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3)(C) on November 5, 2003. Meanwhile, on 
October 7, 2003 Zions filed a Motion to Dismiss as to Defendant Zion's Holding 
Company. On Friday December 12, 2003 the above two Motions were heard by the 
district court. Zions prevailed on its Motion to Dismiss and Heal prevailed on its Motion 
to Serve Complaint and Summons on Defendant Overton Pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3)(C). In 
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relation to the Motion to Dismiss, Heal asserted that pursuant to the Listing Agreement 
Zions must pay Heal a brokerage fee on any and all lease renewals. A lease renewal 
occurred in this case because the tenant Heal located pursuant to the Listing Agreement, 
who had signed a lease with Zions on or about July 30, 1999, renewed the lease with 
Zions on or about April 15, 2003 for a period of two years. Zions asserts that the 
Protection Period limits its responsibility to pay brokerage fees under the Listing 
Agreement.3 On April 22, 2004 the district court conducted oral argument on the Fee 
Affidavit and Fee Objection related to the above motions and hearings. On May 5, 2004 
the district court conducted a telephone conference between the parties related to entering 
findings of fact and conclusions of law related to the above proceedings and entering a 
final judgment as to Zions pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b). 
Disposition below: The district court found that notwithstanding the fact that the 
Agreement identifies "Glen Overton/AND HIS INTERESTS" as the "Seller" the 
[Listing] Agreement was implicitly ratified by Zions by virtue of Zions' payment to Heal 
of the original commission associated with the execution of the lease between Zions and a 
third party tenant located by Heal. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Conclusions of Law f 1. The district court granted Heal's motion to serve summons and 
3As is plainly explained in Amicus Brief filed by the Utah Association of Realtors 
and the National Association of Realtors as outlined in footnote 2, protection periods 
exist to prevent fraud by the seller and/or buyer. Protection periods do not exist to limit 
the payment of commissions. Amicus Brief, pgs. 5, 7 and 8. 
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complaint on Overton pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3)(C). After considering matters outside the 
pleadings, the district court treated Zions' Motion to Dismiss as a motion for summary 
judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court 
concluded that a commission on a lease renewal "is only due and owing if it arises within 
the [Protection [Pjeriod specified in the [Listing]Agreement pursuant to a lease 
renewal." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusions of Law f^ 7. 
Furthermore, the district court concluded that the Listing Agreement "does not provide 
for a commission payment in perpetuity on any lease renewal." Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Conclusions of Law f^ 7. The district court further certified its 
decision as it relates to Zions' Motion to Dismiss and the district court's interpretation of 
the Listing Agreement pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b). The district 
court granted Zions fees and costs in the amount of $8,270.50 based on the language of 
the Listing Agreement allowing the collection of attorneys' fees (the district court relied 
on UCA 78-27-56.5 to apply the attorneys' fee clause of the contract to both parties). 
Heal appeals: 1) the district court's findings related to liability for lease renewals under 
the Listing Agreement; 2) for a reversal of the grant of attorneys' fees; and 3) for an 
award of Heal's reasonably incurred attorneys' fees, or instructions to the lower court to 
determine Heal's reasonable attorney's fees in prosecuting this matter in front of both the 
district court and the appellate court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
10 
1. Zions is a Utah limited liability company, separate and distinct from its 
members and validly formed on or about February 2, 1997. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Findings of Fact f^ 1. 
2. On or about June 30, 1999, Heal prepared and Glen Overton/ and his interests" 
executed a Listing Agreement, a copy of which is attached to the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law as Exhibit A. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Findings of 
Fact f 2. 
3. The Listing Agreement identifies "the Seller" as "Glen Overton/and his 
interests." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Findings of Fact f 3. 
4. The district court found that regardless of the party listed as the Seller, the 
Listing Agreement was implicitly ratified by Zions when Zions paid Heal the commission 
associated with the execution of the initial lease between Zions and a tenant found by 
Heal. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusions of Law f 1 . 
5. The Listing Agreement provides for a listing period beginning June 23, 
1999 and ending on September 23, 1999. (Hereinafter "the Listing Period"). Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Findings of Fact % 4. 
6. Paragraph 2 of the Listing Agreement mandates the payment of 
commissions to Heal by Zions for "any and all lease renewals." Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Findings of Fact f 5. 
7. Paragraph 2 of the Listing Agreement specifically states: 
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BROKERAGE FEE. If, during the Listing Period, the Company, the 
Seller's Agent, The Seller, another real estate agent, or anyone else locates a 
party who is ready, willing and able to buy, lease, or exchange (collectively 
referred to as "acquire") the Property, or any part thereof, at the listing price 
and terms stated on the attached property data information form, or any 
other price and terms to which the Seller may agree in writing, the Seller 
agrees to pay to the Company a brokerage fee in the amount of six percent 
(6%) of such acquisition price. In the case of a lease of the Property, the 
commission shall be the commission percentage times the aggregate of all 
lease payments during the full term of the lease. Seller shall be obligated to 
pay a commission on [sic] of six percent (6%) on any and all lease renewals 
at the time of such renewals. The brokerage fee, unless otherwise agreed in 
writing by the Seller and the Company, shall be due and payable on (a) the 
date of closing of the acquisition of the Property; or (b) c50% due and 
payable when the lease is signed, and 50% due and payable upon the first 
day of the lease commencement; or (c) the first day of the lease renewal 
commencement; or (d) the date the option is signed. 
Listing Agreement Paragraph 2. 
8. Paragraph 3 in the Listing Agreement provides for a Protection Period to Heal 
under the Listing Agreement for a period of twenty-four months following the expiration 
of the Listing Agreement. The Protection Period ran through September 23, 2001. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Findings of Fact j^ 6.4 
9. On or about July 30, 1999, well within the Listing Period, Heal provided Zions 
with a tenant for an initial three (3) year period which extended through August 1, 2002. 
4
 As noted above and in the Amicus Brief, the purpose of a protection period is to 
prohibit the seller from avoiding the payment of the broker's commission by 1) meeting the 
ready and willing buyer provided by the broker, 2) waiting for the expiration of the listing 
period, and 3) selling or leasing the property to the buyer after the expiration of the listing 
period in order to avoid the obligation to pay the commission to the broker. See supra 
footnote 1 and Amicus Brief, Protection Period paragraph, p.7. 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Findings of Fact f 7. 
10. On April 15, 2003, Zions renewed its lease agreement with the tenant found 
by Heal for a period of two (2) years, (hereinafter "Lease Renewal") Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, Conclusions of Law ^ 2. 
11. Heal demanded a commission from Zions for the Lease Renewal and Zions 
refused to pay said commission on the basis that the Lease Renewal was consummated 
outside of the expiration of the Protection Period. See Reply Memorandum to Plaintiffs 
Response to Zion's Holding Company, L.C.'s Motion to Dismiss, p.4. 
12. Paragraph 7 of the Listing Agreement provides that the prevailing party in a 
lawsuit shall be entitled to an award of attorneys' fees incurred to prosecute or defend any 
rights under the contract. Listing Agreement Paragraph 7. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Pursuant to the Terms of the Listing Agreement the Commission for 
the Lease Renewal Should be Paid to Heal. 
The district court erred in concluding that the Listing Agreement precludes the 
payment of commissions on the Lease Renewal unless such Lease Renewal occurred 
during the Protection Period. Such a ruling is in direct contravention of the express terms 
of the Listing Agreement. Furthermore, the Protection Period does not exist to govern 
the payment of commissions on lease renewals but instead exists to protect brokers from 
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possible fraud by sellers and buyers.5 Finally, commissions on lease renewals are 
commonly paid to brokers to award them for the economic benefit created for the 
seller/lessor. See Amicus Brief, "the Perpetuity Argument" paragraph, p. 8-9. 
2. The Attorneys' Fees Granted to Zions by the District Court Should be 
Disallowed and Heal Should be Awarded its Reasonable Attorneys' 
Fees. 
The Listing Agreement entitles the prevailing party to recover its attorneys' fees. 
In the event this Court overturns the district court's order, Zions will no longer be the 
prevailing party and therefore will not be entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to the Listing 
Agreement. Furthermore, where a contract provides attorneys' fees for the prevailing 
party, caselaw supports granting the prevailing party on appeal its fees and costs for both 
the district court and prosecuting the appeal. In the event this Court overturns the lower 
court and finds in favor of Heal, Heal is entitled to its reasonable fees and costs and the 
matter should be remanded to the lower court for the sole purpose of determining Heal's 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Plain Meaning of the Listing Agreement Provides for a Commission to be 
Paid to Heal for any and all Lease Renewals. 
A. The Plain Meaning of the Listing Agreement Controls 
5See supra footnote 2 citing the Utah Association of Realtors and National 
Association of Realtors Amicus Brief. 
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On appeal, the district court's interpretation of a contract is a question of law that 
this Court reviews for correctness, and on such questions the appellate court accords the 
district court's interpretation "no presumption of correctness." Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 
1217, 1220 (Utah \995)(quoting Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 
749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988)). At issue before this Court is the interpretation of 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Listing Agreement which provide as follows: 
2. Brokerage Fee. If, during the Listing Period, the Company, the Seller's 
Agent, The Seller, another real estate agent, or anyone else locates a party 
who is ready, willing and able to buy, lease, or exchange (collectively 
referred to as "acquire") the Property, or any part thereof, at the listing price 
and terms stated on the attached property data information form, or any 
other price and terms to which the Seller may agree in writing, the Seller 
agrees to pay to the Company a brokerage fee in the amount of six percent 
(6%) of such acquisition price. In the case of a lease of the Property, the 
commission shall be the commission percentage times the aggregate of all 
lease payments during the full term of the lease. Seller shall be obligated to 
pay a commission on [sic] of six percent (6%) on any and all lease renewals 
at the time of such renewals. The brokerage fee, unless otherwise agreed in 
writing by the Seller and the Company, shall be due and payable on (a) the 
date of closing of the acquisition of the Property; or (b) 50% due and 
payable when the lease is signed, and 50% due and payable upon the first 
day of the lease commencement; or (c) the first day of the lease renewal 
commencement; or (d) the date the option is signed. The Company is 
authorized to share the brokerage fee with another brokerage participating 
in any transaction arising out of this Listing Agreement. 
3. Protection Period. If within twenty-four months after the termination 
or expiration of this Listing Agreement, the Property is acquired by a party 
to whom the Property was offered or shown by the Company, the Seller's 
Agent, the Seller, another real estate agent, or by any other person during 
the Listing Period, the Seller agrees to pay to the Company the brokerage 
fee stated in Section 2 unless the Seller is obligated to pay a brokerage fee 
on such acquisition to another brokerage pursuant to another valid listing 
contract entered into after the expiration or termination date of this Listing 
Agreement. 
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Listing Agreement Paragraphs 2 and 3. In relation to the above two paragraphs, the 
district court concluded that a commission on the Lease Renewal "is only due and owing 
if it arises within the [PJrotection [PJeriod specified in the [Listing] Agreement pursuant 
to a lease renewal" Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusions of Law f 7. 
Furthermore, the district court concluded that the Listing Agreement "does not provide 
for a commission payment in perpetuity on any lease renewal." Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Conclusions of Law ]f 7. The above two conclusions of law are in 
error and are inconsistent with the clear meaning and unambiguous language of the 
contract. 
When examining a contract the primary source of inquiry is the contract itself, 
"considered in its entirety." Hal Taylor Associates v. UnionAmerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 
749 (Utah 1982)(citations omitted). Not only should the contract be considered in its 
entirety, but the agreement as a whole should be examined given "the circumstances, 
nature and purpose of the contract." Utah State Medical Association v. Utah State 
Employees Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643, 646 (Utah 1982)(citations omitted). The 
circumstances, nature and purpose of this Listing Agreement were simply that the 
defendants owned an office building located at 1500 North 150 West, Provo, Utah, and 
needed tenants to occupy the building. The Listing Agreement made Heal the 
"authorized" agent to list the property during the Listing Period. Simply put, if Heal 
found a tenant, ready, willing and able, within the 90 day Listing Period it was entitled to 
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the commissions provided for in the Listing Agreement; if Heal did not find a tenant, no 
commissions would be due. Thus, one of the main purposes of the Listing Agreement 
was to provide guidelines for the payment of commission for services rendered under the 
Listing Agreement, including commissions for finding a tenant and commissions on all 
lease renewals entered into by that tenant during or after the Protection Period. 
Lease renewals and the brokerage fees associated with them are specifically 
addressed in Paragraph 2 of the Listing Agreement; Paragraph 2 also addresses brokerage 
fees due for the initial sale or lease of the property. The first sentence of Paragraph 2 
outlines the commission to be paid if a ready and willing buyer is found during the Listing 
Period. The third sentence of Paragraph 2 addresses the commission (or brokerage fee) 
for "any and all lease renewals," commissions separate from the commission for initially 
selling or leasing the property. Because the Lease Renewal commission is a new and 
separate commission from the initial brokerage fee for selling or leasing the property, the 
timing of its payment is not governed by the time period controlling the initial brokerage 
fee but is governed by the clear language found at the latter end of Paragraph 2. 
Paragraph 2 of the Listing Agreement clearly states that commissions for lease renewals 
are due "the first day of the lease renewal commencement." Thus, the closing sentences 
of the brokerage fee paragraph of the Listing Agreement, set the time period for paying 
the lease renewal commissions, not the Protection Period paragraph. Furthermore, 
paragraph 3 of the Listing Agreement clearly mandates the payment of a brokerage fee, if 
17 
the property is acquired by a party located by the Broker during the Listing Period. There 
is no mention in paragraph three of any limitations placed on the payment of commissions 
for lease renewals. 
The district court's interpretation erroneously limits the commissions due on lease 
renewals to lease renewals entered into during the Protection Period. Such an 
interpretation ignores the plain meaning of the following sentence: "Seller shall be 
obligated to pay a commission on [sic] of six percent (6%) on any and all lease renewals 
at the time of such renewals." Listing Agreement Paragraph 2. The district court's 
decision also ignores option (c) of paragraph 2 which plainly provides for the payment of 
commissions for lease renewals on "the first day of the lease renewal commencement." 
The district court states that "the agreement does not provide for a commission payment 
in perpetuity on any lease renewal." Such a conclusion rewrites the contract. 
Furthermore such an interpretation flies in the face of a long-standing rule in Utah "that 
persons dealing at arm's length are entitled to contract on their own terms without the 
intervention of the courts to relieve either party from the effects of a bad bargain." Hal 
Taylor Associates v Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749(Utah l9S2)(citing Biesinger 
v. Behunin, Utah 584 P.2d 801(1978). The parties have contracted for their rights and the 
Listing Agreement plainly states that a commission is due on "any and all lease 
renewals." The district court cannot go back, rewrite the agreement and place a time limit 
on Zions' obligation to pay the commissions on lease renewals. See Jones v. ERA 
18 
Brokers Consolidated, 6 P.3d 1129, 1132 (Utah 2000)(citing Provo City Corp, v. Nielson 
Scott Co,, 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979) (holding that a court cannot rewrite an 
unambiguous contract)). The Listing Agreement sets the time for payment of the lease 
renewal commission as the "first day" of the lease renewal period clearly indicating that 
Zions' obligation to pay the lease renewal commissions continue so long as the lease is 
renewed. 
The district court's interpretation of the Listing Agreement makes the lease 
renewal language superfluous because the original lease was for three years, one year 
longer than the Protection Period and therefore any lease renewal would have fallen 
outside of the Protection Period and therefore outside of the scope of the contract. The 
district court made the following conclusion of law in explanation of its decision: 
There is no ambiguity in the Agreement inasmuch as paragraph three (3) in 
the Agreement specifically references paragraph two (2). When those 
provisions are harmonized together, not read in isolation to one another as 
Heal asserts, it is clear that a commission is payable by Zion's to Heal 
pursuant to the lease renewal only if it arises within the protection period 
which it does not. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, Conclusion of Law [^5. The district 
court's holding and reasoning is illogical. Under the district court's interpretation of the 
Listing Agreement, if parties to a listing agreement wanted to include commissions for 
lease renewals in their contract they would need to include a protection period of 
unlimited duration because the lease renewals could go on indefinitely. Given the reason 
for having a protection period, described below and in the Amicus Brief, a protection 
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period of unlimited duration would be unreasonable. The Protection Period in the Listing 
Agreement is set for two years for the purpose of protecting the Broker's rights related to 
ready, able and willing buyers that the Broker contacted during the Listing Period but 
who sign an initial lease agreement or sales agreement after the expiration of the Listing 
Period, but during the Protection Period. The duration of the Protection Period is a 
reasonable length of time to protect against unscrupulous buyers and sellers and is a 
separate concept from the payment of commissions for lease renewals. 
B. The District Court's Interpretation of the Protection Period Is Not 
Consistent with the Industry-wide Purpose of Protection Periods 
The district court concluded that a commission on a lease renewal "is only due and 
owing if it arises within the [Protection [P]eriod specified in the [Listing] Agreement 
pursuant to a lease renewal/' Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusions of 
Law f 7. Furthermore, the district court concluded that the Listing Agreement "does not 
provide for a commission payment in perpetuity on any lease renewal." Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, Conclusions of Law f^ 7. The above two conclusions of law are 
in error and inconsistent with the clear meaning of the Listing Agreement as explained 
above, and contradict the industry wide meaning of a protection period explained below. 
1. The Protection Period Exists to Protect the Broker, Not to Limit the 
Duration of the Responsibilities Created Under the Listing Agreement 
One of the fundamentals of real estate law is "that a broker is entitled to his 
20 
commission if he has procured a customer ready, willing and able to buy on terms 
prescribed or agreed upon by the seller." Zaniewski v. Mancinone, 435 A.2d 50, 51 
(Conn. 1981)(citations omitted). The above tenet provides that a commission is due if the 
broker's purchaser is ready, willing and able. This tenet does not require the 
consummation of the contract, between the seller and the customer, during the listing 
period. The reason for this is because most, if not all listing agreements have an agreed 
upon "protection period." The purpose of the protection period, in either a commercial or 
residential sale is to prohibit the seller from avoiding the payment of the broker's 
commission by 1) meeting the ready and willing buyer provided by the broker, 2) waiting 
for the expiration of the listing period, and 3) selling or leasing the property to the buyer 
after the expiration of the listing period in order to avoid the obligation to pay the 
commission to the broker. See Realty World Labrum v. Steadman, 737 P.2d 165, 167 
(Utah 1987); See also Amicus Brief, Protection Period paragraph, p.8-9. Simply put, in 
the real estate industry, the protection period exists to protect brokers from potential 
fraudulent activity by the buyer and/or seller and is completely unrelated to the obligation 
to pay a commission on a lease renewal. See Amicus Brief, Protection Period paragraph, 
p.8-9. 
The Listing Agreement between Heal and Zions created a 24-month Protection 
Period beginning after the expiration of the Listing Period. Under the Listing Agreement, 
if Heal found a ready, willing and able buyer or tenant within the Listing Period and that 
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buyer/tenant leased the property during either the Listing Period or the 24 months after 
the Listing Period's expiration, the Protection Period, then a commission was due Heal. 
Thus, the Protection Period protects Heal and allows it to benefit from its work in finding 
a ready, willing and able buyer during the Listing Period, if said buyer buys or leases the 
property during the Protection Period. Heal's benefit is a brokerage commission which in 
this and most listing agreements is paid as a percentage of the economic benefit given to 
the seller from the broker's work. 
In the case at bar the district court erroneously applied the Protection Period to 
limit Zions' responsibility to pay commissions on lease renewals. As is made abundantly 
clear in the Amicus Brief filed by the Utah Association of Realtors and the National 
Association of Realtors, such is not the purpose of the Protection Period. The two 
Associations state as follows: 
For the lower court to rule that the Protection Period applied in a way so as 
to prohibit real estate professional from receiving a commission upon lease 
renewal is contrary to the common and essentially universal understanding 
of the meaning of a listing agreement protection period provision. Simply 
put, that is not the intent of incorporating a protection period into a valid 
and enforceable listing agreement. If this Court were to affirm and 
perpetuate the District Court's decision, the real estate industry as a whole 
will be negatively impacted, and there will be considerable confusion 
between the significance of Protection Periods in Lftah as compared with 
the completely different understanding of such language in the balance of 
the country. 
Amicus Brief, Protection Period paragraph, p. 8. Furthermore, the district court's holding 
eliminates any and all commissions for lease renewals. Therefore, the seller gets the full 
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economic benefit of the broker's work without the responsibility of paying the 
commission. Such a result is not consistent with the language of the Listing Agreement 
and applies the Protection Period inconsistent with its true purpose. 
The purpose of the Protection Period in this Listing Agreement is consistent with 
protection periods provided in standard listing agreements in the industry. Given the 
industry-wide purpose of protection periods and the unambiguous meaning of the contract 
outlined above, the district court's application of the Protection Period to limit the 
duration of the contract as it relates to lease renewals is clearly erroneous. Thus, the 
district court's interpretation of the contract is unsupported by the plain meaning of the 
Protection Period, the plain meaning and language of the contract as it relates to the 
payment of commissions for lease renewals and rewrites the agreement knowingly 
entered into by the parties. 
C. Commissions on Lease Renewals are Commonly Negotiated and Paid 
by Landlords/Sellers to Brokers. 
Brokers and sellers of property frequently negotiate for the payment of 
commissions for lease renewals in listing agreements. Amicus Brief, The Perpetuity 
Argument paragraph, p 8-9. The purpose of a commission for lease renewals is two-fold: 
first, it rewards the broker a fixed percentage of the economic benefit provided to the 
seller through the continued leasing of its premises by the tenant provided by the broker; 
and second, it protects the broker from possible fraud by the seller and/or the buyer. For 
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example, if no lease renewal clause existed, the seller and buyer could purposely 
negotiate and sign a short initial lease containing numerous options to renew and thus 
limit the amount of the commission payable to the broker on the initial lease. In this 
Listing Agreement the negotiation resulted in a contract term providing for a commission 
"of six percent (6%) on any and all lease renewals at the time of such renewals." This 
lease renewal provision cannot be any clearer. Zions must pay Heal a commission for 
"any and all" lease renewals regardless of when renewed. 
In Amerus Property Brokers v. Hicklin, 585 N.W.2d 245 (Iowa 1998), a listing 
agreement provided for a five percent commission for the initial lease and "negotiated 
renewals." After the conclusion of the initial lease term the tenant and landlord, without 
the assistance of the broker entered into a second lease for a three-year term. Amerus 
Property Brokers v. Hicklin 585 N.W.2d 245,247 (Iowa 1998). The broker learned of the 
second lease and demanded a commission based on the terms in the listing agreement. 
The Iowa Supreme Court concluded that commissions were due to the broker because the 
landlord was benefitting from the work done by the broker and "must be held to the 
bargain it memorialized in the listing agreement." Id. at 249. Similarly, Zions benefitted 
from the work done by Heal and must also "be held to the bargain it memorialized in the 
listing agreement." Zions is therefore liable to Heal for a commission of 6% on the Lease 
Renewal. Thus, this Court should overturn the district court's interpretation of the 
contract and order Zions to pay Heal the commission for the Lease Renewal. 
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II. If this Court Reverses the District Court's Holding, Heal is Entitled to an 
Award of Attorney Fees for Services Rendered Before the District Court and 
Before this Court. 
In the event that the Appellate Court reverses the district court's decision related 
to liability under the contract for lease renewals, two grounds support an award to Heal 
of the attorneys' fees and costs it has incurred in prosecuting the complaint and this 
appeal. First, the Listing Agreement provides for the recovery of fees by the prevailing 
party. Second, caselaw clearly indicates that a prevailing party on appeal can recover its 
fees and costs from the district court action and from prosecuting the appeal. 
A. Attorneys' Fees Are Available Under the Listing Agreement. 
The basis for HeaPs claim for attorneys' fees is the Listing Agreement between 
Zions and Heal. Paragraph 7 of the Listing Agreement provides that the prevailing party 
in a lawsuit shall be entitled to an award of attorneys' fees to prosecute or defend any 
rights under the contract. Listing Agreement Paragraph 7. 
B. A Provision for Payment of Attorneys' Fees in a Contract Includes 
Attorneys' Fees Incurred by a Prevailing Party on Appeal as Well as at Trial. 
The rule in Utah has long been that where a contract provides for attorneys' fees to 
the prevailing party, said fees include attorneys' fees incurred at the district court level 
and incurred on appeal. See Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 
P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980)(overruling Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate & Investment Co., 3 
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Utah 2d 121, 279 P.2d 709(Utah 1955)). The district court's granting of attorneys' fees 
to a party is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Keith Jorgensen's, Inc. v. Ogden 
City Mall Co., 26 P.3d 872, 876 (Utah App.2001)(citing Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy 
Corp., 993 P.2d 222). In the event that Zions does not prevail on appeal, the award of 
attorneys' fees to Zions by the district court must be reversed. Heal would become the 
prevailing party and would be entitled to its attorneys' fees. In the event this Court 
overturns the district court on all aspects yet does not award Heal its fees pursuant to the 
Listing Agreement and Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 34(a) then this Court 
should remand the issue of Heal's fees to the district court to determine Heal's reasonable 
attorneys' fees incurred during the prosecution of the district court action and appeal. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Because the district court's interpretation of the Listing Agreement: 1) ignores 
the plain meaning of the contract; 2) ignores the industry wide purpose of a protection 
period; and 3) rewrites the agreement as negotiated between two equally competent 
parties, the district court's interpretation of the contract should be reversed and the 
commission for the Lease Renewal should be paid to Heal. Furthermore, Heal is 
entitled to its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred before the district court and 
the appellate court. Thus, this Court should reverse the district court's interpretation of 
the Listing Agreement, disallow Zions' attorneys' fees and costs and remand this action 
to the district court for the sole purpose of determining Heal's reasonable costs and fees 
incurred before the district and appellate courts. 
Dated this 29th day of September, 2004. 
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ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(a)(l 1) no addendum is 
necessary because this appeal turns on the interpretation of a contract and not on any 
constitutional provision, statute, rule or regulation. 
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